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Centralised Order Books versus Hybrid Order Books: 
A Paired Comparison of Trading Costs on NSC (Euronext Paris) and 
SETS (London Stock Exchange) 
Abstract 
This article aims at comparing the cost of trading on SETS, the hybrid order-driven 
segment of the London Stock Exchange for the trading of large capitalisations, and 
NSC, the centralised electronic order book of Euronext. Based on two stock samples 
paired according to economic sector, free float capitalisation and trading volumes, our 
research shows that transaction costs are lower on NSC than SETS. By allowing 
larger transactions, the presence of dealers on SETS admittedly improves immediacy 
and contributes to the development of the block market, but at the expense of higher 
execution costs for all other trades and heavier adverse selection and inventory costs 
inside the order book. 
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Centralised Order Books versus Hybrid Order Books: 
A Paired Comparison of Trading Costs on NSC (Euronext Paris) and SETS 
(London Stock Exchange) 
Trading costs on a financial market depend on the characteristics of the traded security, but 
also on the structure of the market, and the order placement strategies of market participants. 
The rules of trading affect the probability of various trading strategies (Harris (1997)) and 
hence affect price formation and implicit transaction costs, and the way the market design 
impacts the cost of trade execution is a fundamental issue. Firstly, it may substantially alter 
portfolio performances. Recently, basing their research on the order and transaction database 
of Elkins/McSherry,
1 Domowitz et al. (2001) study the range of, and the factors determining, 
trading costs, and analyse the interactions between costs, liquidity and volatility in 42 
countries, between September 1996 and December 1998. They offer evidence of a high 
degree of variability of trading costs across countries, which might limit the gains from 
international diversification. Secondly, in a context of competition between stock exchanges 
and of revision of the European ISD, the comparison of trading costs between exchanges with 
different trading mechanisms is extremely relevant for regulators. 
A large number of articles have already compared the liquidity of the two main market 
models: quote-driven markets as NASDAQ or SEAQ
2 or most fixed income markets, where 
market makers commit themselves to post continuously bid and ask prices for minimal 
quantities of assets, and order-driven markets, as most equity markets, where buy and sell 
orders originating from final clients are directly matched against one another. 
In reality, most stock exchanges have now converged, at least for the trading of Blue Chips, to 
a common market model: the electronic order book. Even the London Stock Exchange (LSE), 
where the dealership structure had always been the traditionally prevailing model, finally 
changed its trading mechanism for Blue Chips. In October 1997, the previous quote-driven 
system has progressively been replaced by an electronic order-driven system. However, in 
spite of their common features, some differences in market organisation still remain between 
auction markets: different tick sizes, different roles and duties assigned to intermediaries etc. 
                                                 
1 Some consultants sell measurements of their trading costs to institutional investors, be they asset managers or brokers. For 
example, the Elkins/McSherry consultancy, now a branch of the State Street bank, measures explicit and implicit trading 
costs for institutional investors. Implicit costs are measured by the spread between the investor’s trading prices and a 
reference price calculated as an average of four indicators: the day high, low, opening and closing quotes.  
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In particular, the rules regulating the off-order-book transactions and internalising practices 
may differ substantially, so that, on some exchanges, the order flow mainly concentrate in the 
order book while, on others, the proportion of order flow executed outside the order book is 
significant. Our study focuses on this last issue and addresses the question of whether trading 
in a pure order-driven system is less costly than trading in a hybrid order-driven system where 
dealers still execute a substantial part of the order flow. 
To this goal, on the basis of intra-day market data (both orders and trades), we analyse 
transaction costs on SETS,
3 the electronic order book open for the trading of Blue Chips at the 
LSE, and NSC, the electronic order-driven system of Euronext Paris. At the LSE, SETS 
securities are traded in the order book as well as with dealers off the order book, whereas on 
Euronext Paris, all stocks are traded on NSC,
4 which is an almost pure centralised electronic 
order book, for which a concentration rule
5 applies. 
Our methodology consists in constructing two samples of securities, paired according to their 
economic sectors, free float market capitalisations and trading volumes. This methodology 
compares to that of Huang and Stoll (1996a) and Venkataraman (2001). It ensures that 
empirical results can be assigned to differences in market structures and not to corporate 
differences in compared stocks. In a first stage, we compute various measures of spreads and 
their components across the paired samples; in a second stage, we check the quality of the 
matching procedure and attempt to identify explanatory variables for the observed 
differences. 
Section 1 provides an overview of previous research and sets the testable hypotheses. Section 
2 compares the organisation of NSC for Euronext Paris and SETS for the LSE. Section 3 
describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 compares both markets’ transaction costs 
and their components. Section 5 investigates to which extent some economic factors may 
explain the differences and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 SEAQ is the Stock Exchange Automated Quotations system. This screen-based trading system was introduced on October 
27, 1986, as part of the City's Big Bang, to carry market makers' bid and offer quotes and trade reports for UK securities. 
3 The Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service (SETS) replaced the quote-driven market system for Blue Chips in October 
1997. 
4 NSC stands for Nouveau Système de Cotation. 
5 The concentration rule implies that any trade has to be executed inside the order book. If a trade is negotiated off the 
electronic order book, according to Euronext regulation, it should still be executed in the order book (the buyer (the seller) 
submitting a buy and a sell order simultaneously) at a price inside the bid-ask spread, otherwise all standing limit orders at a 
better price are to be absorbed before executing the trade.  
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1. Previous research and testable hypotheses 
1.1. Previous literature 
A host of theoretical and empirical papers have compared diverse market structures with 
different trading rules, different transparency duties, different pricing constraints etc. (Tinic 
and West (1974), Hamilton (1976), Ho and Macris (1985), Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1986), 
Marsh and Rock (1986), Reinganum (1990), Madhavan (1992), Biais (1993), Pagano and 
Roëll (1992, 1996), Affleck-Graves et al. (1994), Biais, Foucault and Salanié (1998)), Keim 
and Madhavan (1994, 1998)). Most of these works are in favour of electronic order-driven 
markets. According to Domowitz et al. (2001), Euronext Paris ranks among the cheapest 
(30 bp), whereas implicit costs on the LSE before the introduction of the SETS order book 
locate this exchange among the most expensive. Jain (2001), analyses, in a high number of 
exchanges, the impact of institutional factors on market performance, measured by quoted, 
effective and realised spreads, volatility and turnover ratios. The factors identified are: market 
organisation, trading mechanism, trading system, market transparency, degree of 
fragmentation, share ownership structure and their variability over time. Based upon the 15 
biggest Blue Chips of 51 stock exchanges, Jain (2001)’s study evidences that order-driven 
market structures record lower costs and volatility than quote-driven markets, and that in 
Europe, Euronext Paris and the Swiss Stock Exchange show the lowest spreads. 
The main limit of these works lays in that they may measure corporate differences between 
sample stocks instead of market design effects. To eliminate this potential bias, some studies 
have compared the cost of trading stocks listed on an order-driven exchange and the cost of 
trading of the same stocks in a competing quote-driven market (Blume and Goldstein (1992), 
Roëll (1992), De Jong, Nijman and Roëll (1993), Lee(1993), Petersen and Fialkowski (1994), 
Huang and Stoll (1996b)) generally measure larger spreads on dealer markets. Studying LSE 
trading in French stocks, Gresse (2001) concludes to a greater depth of the dealer market 
associated to larger spreads. However, these results may be subject to a domestic bias. 
Recent research papers have then made two-market liquidity comparisons by matching 
samples in order to estimate the impact of the market structure and organisation. Huang and 
Stoll (1996a) calculate liquidity indicators for the NASDAQ and the NYSE. Their sample is 
made of pairs of securities from both markets, formed by considering the company sector, 
long-term debt, share price criteria, as well as the number of admitted shares and the book 
value. Venkataraman (2001) uses the same methodology to compare the Paris Stock  
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Exchange and the NYSE, and matches firms on industry, market price and market size. Our 
methodology follows this approach. 
Finally, while nowadays on almost every stock exchange, large capitalisations are traded in 
electronic order-driven systems, very few studies focus on the impact of the design of order 
books on trading costs. Venkataraman (2001) provides a paired comparison of an automated 
order-driven market and a floor-based order-driven market; closer to our analysis, Kasch-
Haroutounian and Theissen (2003), with matched samples, show that spreads are slightly 
lower on Xetra (the electronic order book of Deutsche Börse) than on NSC (Euronext Paris), 
but find that the observed differences are mainly related to corporate factors; yet, to our 
knowledge, no empirical work put into balance a hybrid order-driven system with multiple 
dealers and a centralised order-driven system. 
1.2. Testable hypotheses 
Given the relative advantages of dealer and auction systems, many exchanges have chosen 
mixed structures allowing dealers to negotiate trades outside the order book. Very few studies 
have compared the liquidity of these mixed systems with the one of pure centralised order 
books. 
On the one hand, dealers may provide additional depth and immediacy to the order book and 
thus complement the trading services offered by the exchange. Some empirical studies as 
those of Tinic and West (1974), Jain (2001), Gresse (2001), Swan and Westerholm (2004), 
conclude to the superiority of such mixed structures. On the other hand, the fragmentation of 
the order flow may lower the probability of execution in the order book and increase adverse 
selection costs in the market, and thus be detrimental to liquidity (see Mendelson (1987), 
Chowdry and Nanda (1991)). Moreover, dealer may skim off profitable uninformed orders 
from the order book, which would increase spreads in the book (Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara 
(1996)). Therefore, by using SETS and NSC best quote and trade data, we propose to test the 
following hypotheses. 
Volatility 
H1.  As shown in Biais (1993), prices  are less volatile on fragmented markets than on 
centralised markets, so that volatility is lower on a hybrid order-driven market involving 
multiple dealers in competition beside the book (HOM) like SETS, than on a pure 
centralised order-driven market (COM) like NSC.  
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Spreads and trade size 
H2.  The internalisation of a substantial part of the order flow by dealers in a HOM 
fragments the market and enlarges quoted and effective spreads in comparison with a 
COM. 
H3.  Dealers provide additional immediacy in a HOM in comparison with a COM, so that 
– trade sizes are superior in the HOM (H3a); 
– the marginal cost trading one unit of asset is less in the HOM (H3b); 
– large transactions are more expensive in the COM (H3c). 
Spread components 
H4.  The inventory cost component of spreads is greater in the HOM than in the COM, 
because of the dealers’ liquidity-providing activity beside the order book. 
H5.  A COM being more transparent by nature, the adverse selection component of its 
spreads exceeds the one of HOM spreads. 
H6.  In a HOM, dealers try to attract the least informed part of the order flow, so that the 
adverse selection risk borne inside the order book of a HOM is more than the one 
incurred in a COM. 
2. A comparison of the organisations of SETS and NSC 
2.1. Common features 
The London and Paris markets have similar fundamental characteristics: intermediaries have 
multiple capacities, which means that they may act either on their own account, possibly in 
the context of market making, or on account of their clients. 
The 1986 reform of the LSE enabled to remove the distinction between brokers and market 
makers (all financial institutions could from then on, play the role of a market maker), and 
liberalised pricing regulations. At present, the LSE admits only a single type of 
intermediaries, the so-called broker-dealers, which have a dual capacity. This reform enabled 
to introduce SEAQ, a single display system for the quotes of all London listed shares. The 
second important reform happened in 1997 and led to the creation of SETS, an electronic and 
continuous order-driven trading system for Blue Chips. 
Euronext Paris, for its part, implemented two significant market reforms in 1986 and 1988:  
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– the “agents de change” were replaced by the “sociétés de bourse”, entitled, like 
British intermediaries, to act both as brokers or on their own account; 
– the old centralised electronic order-driven CAC system was replaced by a new one 
(now called NSC
6) with improved functionalities. 
On order-driven market systems like NSC or SETS, buy and sell orders coming from final 
clients are centralised in the order book, where they are automatically matched. Unlike on 
quote-driven markets, investors themselves provide liquidity by placing limit orders. 
Securities may be traded either through a call auction, or continuously. On both SETS and 
NSC, the trading day opens with a call auction, then switches to a continuous auction, and 
ends with a closing fixing procedure. 
2.2. Main organisational differences between SETS and NSC 
Though both markets have identical central functionalities, some differences remain. 
Retail market 
At Euronext Paris, orders from retail clients are routed towards the order book and participate 
to the general matching of buy and sell orders. 
In London, orders from retail clients are mostly processed outside the SETS system: Retail 
Service Providers (RSP) act as a counterpart to the orders from private brokers. Those orders 
are in general market orders and are processed at a price at least as favourable as the SETS 
order book best limit. 
Large trades 
On both markets, it is possible to trade blocks without using the automatic order matching 
system. Moreover, Euronext adds a frequently used functionality, called cross trades. A cross 
trade (applications) is an already matched trade entered by an exchange member who found a 
buyer and a seller (he can act on his own account as a counterpart of a client, but can also 
execute client orders against one another). Cross trades have to be processed at a price in the 
range between the order book buy and sell best limits at the time of the trade. Once entered 
into the trading system cross trades become immediately visible by all market members. 
                                                 
6 This system was later adopted by all of Euronext equity markets.  
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Ordinary trades 
At the LSE, any trade can be freely executed either electronically in the order book, or off the 
order book with a dealer without any constraint on execution prices. The only obligation for 
the dealer who executes the trade is to report the transaction within 3 mns to the exchange. 
Conversely, on Euronext, any trade that is not a block trade eligible to the specific block trade 
procedure has to be executed automatically inside the order book at a price that is compatible 
with standing limit orders according to the so-called concentration rule. 
Table 1 synthesises the differences between SETS and NSC. 
Table 1 about here 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Stock selection and sample matching 
The present research considers all spreads and trades during the first semester of 2001. 
Trading data and quotes were extracted from the BDM
7 market database as far as Euronext 
Paris is concerned, and from the intra-day database of the LSE (Transaction Data Service). 
Our sample contain all securities that belong to the index SBF250 for the French market or to 
the index FTSE250 for the British market at the date of January the 1
st of 2001, excluding 
those for which quotes are available for less than 10 days in any month of the observation 
period and Euronext stocks that are traded at daily call auctions only. These criteria produce a 
sample of 211 securities for the French market and 492 for the British market from which 157 
are listed on SETS. 
To pair the samples from Euronext Paris and the LSE, a pairing algorithm almost similar to 
that of Huang and Stoll (1996a) and Venkataraman (2001) was used, which relates securities 
according to: 
– their Dow Jones Economic Sector,
8 
– their free float on January 2001, according to Dow Jones Indexes free float 
definition,
9 
– their total trading volumes in euros during the first semester of 2001. 
                                                 
7 “Bases de données de marché”. 
8 Dow Jones indexes classification considers ten economic sectors: Basic Materials, Consumer Cyclical, Consumer Non-cyclical, Energy, 
Financial, Healthcare, Industrial, Technology, Telecommunications, Utilities. 
9 The free float of a security is equal to its market capitalisation minus cross-participations of 5% or more held by public organisations or 
individuals.  
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The Dow Jones sector was available for only 96 Euronext firms; for each of these 96 
Euronext-listed companies, all possible pairs with LSE-listed firms of the same sector were 
considered. Among all LSE stocks belonging to the same sector as the Euronext stock i, the 
London security j* that minimised the difference between the two pairing characteristics other 






























ip X  is the value of the p
th match criterion for stock i on Euronext Paris; 
– 
LSE
jp X  is the value of the p
th match criterion for stock j on the LSE. 
The joint match resulted in 55 pairs of firms. The comparison of the matched samples is 
developed in Section 4. 
3.2. Measurement of implicit trading costs 
A financial market participant bears two types of trading costs: explicit and implicit trading 
costs, the latter resulting from the difference between bid and ask prices. The study only 
focuses on implicit costs by looking at diverse measures of spreads. 
3.2.1. Quoted  spreads 
On agency markets, where quotes appear in the order book, quoted spreads refer to the best 
buy and sell limits. They measure the cost that would be borne by an investor that would buy 
and immediately sell a security whose fundamental value remains unchanged, for a quantity 
lower or equal to the quantities available at the order book best limits. 
()
Mid
limit buying Best limit selling Best
spread Quoted
−
=   (2).
For each stock, the time-weighted average quoted spread over the whole observation period is 
computed, then an equally-weighted mean of individual averages is calculated across each 
sample.  
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3.2.2. Effective  spreads 
Effective spreads measure the implicit cost borne in a transaction by the one out both 
counterparts that is demanding liquidity.
10 
The effective spread is expressed as a difference between the price of a trade and the mid-





× =   (3).
For each stock, two averages of effective spreads are calculated for the total observation 
period: an equally-weighted mean and a quantity-weighted mean of effective spreads. Then, 
markets are compared on the basis of the samples’ equally-weighted mean. 
3.2.3.  Effective marginal costs 
To compare execution costs on actual trades, we also use an empirical estimation of the Kyle 
λ coefficient, which represents the variation in price necessary to trade a marginal unit of 
asset immediately (Kyle (1985)). Kyle (1985) models the cost of liquidity  as a linear function 
of the traded quantity: at equilibrium, P, the traded price equals  Q λ µ + , where µ  is the risky 
asset’s fundamental value, Q is the signed trade size and λ  is an illiquidity parameter. Kyle 
interprets  λ / 1  as the depth measure as it equals the marginal quantity immediately tradable 
without no price impact. Assuming that the mid price quoted at the time of a trade is the best 
estimate of the stock’s fundamental value, the λ  coefficient may be estimated from the trade 
characteristics by 
Q
Mid price Trading −
. Unfortunately, this measure is sensitive to corporate 
actions and price level, and does not allow unbiased cross-sectional comparisons. Reporting 
the relative effective spread to the monetary trade size provides a measure of the marginal 
cost of immediacy that is insensitive to price level: 
euros n i size Trade
Mid
Mid price Trading
t cos inal arg m Effective
−
=   (4).
                                                 
10 Cross trades on Euronext can only be made at prices comprised between the order book best buy an sell prices at the time 
of the trade. Thus, for this category of trades, the effective spread is necessarily lower than the quoted spread. Both in 
London and in Paris, for trades processed in the order book, on the reverse, a new order is at best, matched only at the best 
limit on the other market side, and possibly by other less favourable limits if the quantity offered for the best bid price is not 
sufficient: for these transactions, the effective spread is thus necessarily bigger than the quoted spread.  
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The “effective marginal cost” as calculated in equation (4) may be viewed as the marginal 
increase in spread (in %) supported to buy or sell 1 € of capital immediately. For each stock 
of our samples, this ratio is computed with trade sizes in thousand € and averaged on both an 
equally-weighted and a quantity-weighted basis. Sample means are equally-weighted. 
3.3. Measurement of spread components 
Spreads are static measures of execution costs. Another way of comparing transaction costs 
consists in considering the dynamics of quotes and trade prices and temporary price changes, 
to estimate the weight of the different components of the spreads on each market, which are 
order-processing, adverse selection and inventory costs. As dealers execute a substantial part 
of the order flow of the SETS hybrid system, we could fairly expect inventory costs to be 
superior on SETS than on NSC (hypothesis H4). 
The methods of spread decomposition existing in the literature divide into two main 
categories: a first group of methodologies based on the covariance of transaction price 
variations (Stoll(1989), George, Kaul and Nimalendram (1991)), a second group of works 
based on trade direction (Glosten and Harris (1988), Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997)). As trade direction 
can be identified from our intra-day data, we choose the second approach. Moreover, given 
that we aim at measuring the impact of dealer activity around the order book on the inventory 
cost component, we need a three-way decomposition methodology, which leads us to select 
the Huang and Stoll’s model. 
Huang and Stoll (1997) first propose a two-way spread decomposition in which λ  is the 
proportion of the effective spread attributable to adverse selection and inventory costs and 
λ − 1  corresponds to the part due to order processing costs. They model the effective spread 
as a constant S expressed in monetary units. S and λ  are GMM estimated on the basis of the 
following equation: 






P + + − = − − λ ∆   (5)
where 
–  t P  is the price of the transaction at time t; 
–  t Q  is the buy-sell trade indicator of the transaction at time t; 
–  t e  is an error term.  
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In a second stage, Huang and Stoll (1997) decompose the λ  parameter into an adverse 
selection component α  and an inventory cost component β  (with  β α λ + = ), using the 
assumption that, under inventory models, changes in quotes affect the subsequent arrival rate 
of trades and thus induce a serial correlation in trade flows. From there, they derive two 
estimation procedures. The first one requires to estimate four parameters, S, α ,  β  plus π , 
the probability of a reversal in trade sign, from the following system: 
()
() () t 2 t 1 t t t
t 2 t 1 t
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The second procedure they develop uses the mid-quote variation instead of the transaction 
price variation, and the observed posted spread that prevails at the time of a trade instead of 
the constant spread S, which reduces to three the number of parameters to estimate. These 
three parameters, α , β  and π  are estimated in order to verify: 
( )
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where  t M  and  t S  are respectively the mid-quote and the quoted spread prevailing just before 
the trade time t. We utilise the second methodology as it produces a higher frequency of 
convergence of the GMM iteration algorithm. Moreover, as shown in Huang and Stoll (1997), 
splitting order practices in order books possibly biases the estimation of the α  parameter by 
generating undervalued π  estimates. To deal with this bias, consecutive trades at the same 
price, on the same side of the market, within a 2 mn (3 mn) window on NSC (SETS), and 
with no change in the bid and ask quotes, are bunched into one single trade.
11 
                                                 
11 This procedure probably overcorrects the problem. Consequently, empirical results provide upper bounds on α and π.  
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4. Comparative analysis of trading costs on SETS and NSC 
4.1. Volatility, spreads and trading characteristics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on volatility, trading costs, quote and trade frequency, 
volumes and trade sizes, for the paired samples. The figures show that the structure of the 
order flow greatly differs from one stock exchange to the other. More than a half of trading 
volumes in euros and in number of trades are executed by dealers outside the order book at 
the LSE. Trades are less frequent but larger on SETS than on NSC: the average size of an 
order-book (off-order-book) trades in a SETS stock reaches 1.4 (2.9) times the one of a NSC 
trade, while the average number of trades per day on SETS (all trades combined) is twice the 
one on NSC, which confirms H3a. 
Table 2 about here 
The average daily return volatility of SETS stocks significantly exceeds the one of NSC 
stocks, although the difference is less than 0.5%, so that we reject hypothesis H1. 
Quoted spreads, effective spreads and marginal costs are significantly higher on SETS than on 
NSC, which validates H2 but invalidates H3b. The tighter quoted spreads on NSC are related 
to a superior frequency of quote revisions. Besides, the difference in effective spreads is less 
than the one in quoted spreads. In fact, in the SETS environment, investors may often 
improve the price of a trade compared to the best limits observed in the order book, while on 
NSC, prices displayed at the best limits most frequently relate to actual trading prices. NSC 
best limits thus appear as a better indicator of the value at which a share is potentially 
tradable, which makes NSC more transparent in terms of pre-trade transparency. 
A breakdown of average effective spreads by 9 classes of transaction size is presented in 
Table 3. It shows that SETS average effective spreads on order book trades (iob) are larger 
than NSC spreads for every class of trades, the single exception being class 9 (trade size > 
2,500 thousand €) for which the difference does not significantly exceeds 0. SETS off-order-
book trades are more expensive than SETS order book trades whatever the class that is 
considered, and the spread difference increases with trade size. However, the weight of large 
trades in the distribution of volumes is greater in London than in Paris: as instance, classes 7 
to 9 account for 52% of total trading volumes and 3.4% of the total number of trades while 
these percentages are respectively 33% and 1.3% on NSC. Moreover, with regard to classes 8 
and 9, the main part of SETS stock trades are executed out of the order book: as a matter of  
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fact, it is much easier to negotiate such trades with dealers on the phone, like in an upstairs 
market, than to find the required depth in the order book. Two other classes have more trades 
executed out of the book at the LSE: class 2 and above all class 1, which conforms to the fact 
that retail orders are not routed to the order book but to specialised dealers, the so-called 
RSPs. Given the class 1 and class 2 spread statistics, these retail orders could find more 
favourable execution inside the order book. In conclusion, with regard to immediacy, our 
results allow us to validate H3a and to reject H3b whereas H3c only holds for very large 
trades. 
Table 3 about here 
All things combined, effective spreads are higher on SETS, where transactions are also larger 
and less frequent. The SETS market is globally more expensive but offers superior immediacy 
in counterpart. This is particularly actual for class 9, which can be viewed as a block trade 
segment. First, as we already mentioned, it is the only class for which SETS order book 
trading costs are equivalent to those observed on NSC. Second, although the average effective 
spread on SETS off-order-book class-9 trades is apparently superior to the one measured on 
NSC class-9 trades, it applies to bigger and more numerous trades of whom many would not 
even be tradable on Euronext Paris.
12 
4.2. Spread components 
Using GMM, we estimate the λ  and the S parameters of equation (5) in a first stage, and the 
α ,  β  and π  parameters of system (7) in a second stage, for both samples of stocks. 
Concerning SETS stocks, two cases are considering: the total universe of trades combining 
order book and off-order-book
13 trades and the universe of book trades only (excluding trades 
executed by dealers). 
4.2.1.  The two-way decomposition: the order processing components versus other components 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics of the λ estimates. 
Table 4 about here 
                                                 
12 In fact, this category of transactions are tradable through a special block trade procedure available on Euronext Paris for 
the largest capitalisations. Block trade data are not part of the public data we use here, but Gajewski and Gresse (2004) have 
analysed them over April 2002 and found that they represented little volume and were much more costly than LSE block 
trades. 
13 VWAP trades are always excluded of the analysis.  
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The estimated values indicate that the order processing component of spreads is maximum for 
SETS stocks when all trades are taken into account, but is minimum for SETS order book 
trades, the mean  λ − 1  estimated value for Euronext stocks being intermediary. However, the 
difference in λ between the SETS order book (off-order-book trades excluded) and Euronext 
is not as significant as the difference observed between SETS (all trades included) and 
Euronext. 
In other words, the component of spreads due to adverse selection and inventory costs is 
lower on the hybrid market than on the centralised auction market, but this is attributable to 
the trades executed by dealers outside the order book. When considering all trades on SETS 
(i.e. including those made outside the order book), the presence of dealers may logically 
increase the order processing cost component. Conversely, in a centralised auction market like 
Euronext, limit order traders do not bear all the direct costs incurred by dealers. 
Moreover, the two segments of SETS probably do not attract the same type of investors. The 
informed will have a tendency to capture limit orders in the order book while the dealers will 
try to attract the less informed order flow (retail investors, institutional investors). 
4.2.3.  The three-way decomposition: adverse selection versus inventory holding 
In order to distinguish the adverse selection cost component from the inventory cost 
component, we now use the Huang and Stoll’ three-way decomposition methodology 
corresponding to system (7). The GMM estimation procedure converged to consistent 
estimates (0<α <1 and 0<β <1) for only 18 stocks listed on SETS and 25 listed on Euronext. 
The model most performed for SETS securities when off-order book are excluded from the 
data. In that case, the GMM algorithm converged to correct estimates for 44 stocks. Table 5 
displays descriptive statistics on the estimated values. 
Table 5 about here 
The  π  probabilities, corresponding to the probability of a reversal in trade direction, are 
inferior to 0.5 for all SETS stocks and for 11 NSC stocks upon 25, which, unexpectedly, 
means that order persistence is higher on SETS. This is probably related to the smaller 
frequency of trades in the SETS market. Conversely to the intuition, β  coefficients, that is 
the percentage of spread assignable to inventory costs, are greater for order books (NSC and 
SETS with in-order-book trades only) than for the hybrid case (SETS all trades combined), so 
that H4 is rejected. Furthermore, the mean β  coefficient obtained on SETS order book trades  
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(25.57%) is significantly superior to the one measured on NSC (17.43%). This 
counterintuitive result could be due to dealers’ market practices as those identified in 
Jacquillat and Gresse (1998): when market makers are competing with an order book, they 
tend to trade preferably in the order book when they need to rebalance inventories. We 
suspect SETS stocks to be subject to such strategies, so that inventory costs are not directly 
reflected by the off-order-book order flow but affect the order book. 
As for α  coefficients, the highest cross-sectional mean value is observed once again for 
SETS in-order-book trades (28.60%). This value decreases dramatically when off-order-book 
trades are included (5.82%) in the analysis. NSC α  coefficients are slightly but significantly 
superior at the 10% threshold, with a cross-sectional mean equal to 9.24%. These findings 
confirm what we suspected with regard to the two-component decomposition: most probably, 
the informed and the uninformed cluster between the order book and the off-order-book 
market, with the major part of the uninformed orders being executed by dealers. In so, we fail 
to reject hypotheses H5 and H6. 
As these observations could be due to sample distortions, we focus on the pairs of securities 
for which the model was correctly estimated for both stocks of the pair. 7 pairs are identified 
and the estimated π , α  and β  coefficients for each member of these pairs are reported in 
Table 6. They confirm our conclusions. 
Table 6 about here 
5.  Which economic factors or institutional specifics best explain the difference in 
execution costs? 
Given the significant difference in trading costs of matched Euronext and SETS stocks, a 
natural question is whether the stocks are actually well matched. Another possibility is that 
some economic variables not included in the matching procedure explain the observed 
differences. These variables comprise stock characteristics such as return volatility or price, 
trading characteristics like the number of trades per day or the imbalance between purchases 
and sales, or finally institutional features including tick size or fragmentation degree. 
5.1. Stock characteristics 
Theoretical models of the bid-ask spread suggest that execution costs differ systematically by 
firm-specific characteristics such as volatility, market size, and stock price. Market size is part 
of our matching criteria. We measured it as the floating market value of the firm at the  
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beginning of the observation period. The rationale for the use of this variable is that firm size, 
and more specifically floating capitalisation, asserts the probability of locating a counterparty 
for a trader (Stoll(2000)), and empirically, spreads are negatively related to market value 
(Huang and Stoll (1996a), Stoll(2000), Venkataraman (2001)…). Another fundamental 
variable which positively affects spreads, is daily return variance,
14 as it measures the risk of 
adverse price changes of a stock put into inventory. For each stock, we calculate the monthly 
variance of daily returns calculated in logarithm on closing mid-quotes. The third corporate 
specific we consider is price level measured as the monthly average closing mid-quote in €. 
The cross-sectional relation between spreads and price is usually negative, reflecting the fixed 
order-processing component of spreads (Venkataraman (2001)), and also because price is an 
additional proxy for risk in that low price stocks tend to be riskier and because of the fixed 
order-processing component of spreads (Stoll (2000)). On that point, there is a structural 
difference in stock price between LSE and Euronext securities, price levels being, in practice, 
substantially inferior on the LSE. 
5.2. Trading characteristics 
On top of the variables previously mentioned, the cross-section of spreads is generally related 
to two firms’ trading characteristics: trading volume and number of trades, the main one being 
trading volume which serves as matching factor. Trading costs vary inversely to trading 
volume and trade frequency, as they reflect economies of scale and lower inventory and 
adverse selection costs. For the same reasons, Stoll (2000) shows that spreads are positively to 
order imbalance. For each stock and each month of the observation period, we then calculate 
the following variables: the daily average trading volume in thousand €, the average number 
of trades per day, the average imbalance per day measured by 
() volumes sell volumes buy volumes sell volumes buy + − . 
5.3. Institutional features 
We consider two main institutional differences that could explain execution costs: tick size 
and trading volumes outside the order book. For a given stock and a given month, we 
calculate the tick variable in percentage by dividing the tick size in € by the average closing 
mid price in €. The percentage of volume traded out of the order book is set to zero for all 
Euronext stocks and equals the ratio off-order-book volume over total intra-day volume for 
                                                 
14 Stoll (1978) shows theoretically that total risk, not systematic risk, is the relevant measure because the unwanted inventory  
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each SETS stock on a given day. Monthly stock-by-stock means of this variable are then 
calculated. 
5.3. Regression design and results 
We run cross-sectional regressions using stock-by-stock monthly average values of spreads 
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t s ∆  is the difference in average spread between the Euronext stock i and its 
matched SETS stock j over the month t; three measures of average spreads are 
considered, the time-weighted average quoted spread ( aqs s ∆ ∆ ≡ ), the equally-
weighted average effective spread ( aes s ∆ ∆ ≡ ) and the quantity-weighted average 
effective spread ( wes s ∆ ∆ ≡ ); 
– 
j , i
t σ ∆  equals stock i’s daily return volatility minus stock j’s daily return volatility 
over month t; 
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i
t V  being the average daily trading volume of 
stock i in thousand € over month t; 
–  ( ) ( )
j i j , i
t FMV ln FMV ln FMV ln − = ∆ , with  i FMV  being the floating market value 
in thousand € of stock i at the start of January 2001; 
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i
t P  denoting the average closing mid-quote of 
stock i for month t; 






t N ln N ln N ln − = ∆  is the difference in the average number of trades per 
day taken in logarithm, of stock i with its paired stock j, over month t; 
– 
j , i
t I ∆  is the difference in the average imbalance per day t of stock i with its paired 







t tick tick tick − = ∆  and  k
t tick  is the tick in percentage of the average closing 
mid-price for stock k and month t; 
                                                                                                                                                          




t FR  is the order flow fragmentation rate during month t for the SETS stock j 
matched to the Euronext stock i measured by off-order-book volume over total 
intra-day trading volume; 
–  it ε  is the error term. 
Computing variance inflation factors for the variables included in regression (8) detects a 
collinearity relation between three variables: the constant variable, the difference in price P ∆ , 
and the fragmentation rate FR. For that reason, the model displayed in equation (8) is not 
estimated directly but three alternative regressions are run separately. In the first one, the  P ∆  
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Finally, the third linear model has no constant either but the fragmentation rate variable is 
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(11).
The comparison of the three different models will permit of identifying which factor among 
the market place, the price level, or the fragmentation rate best explain the cross-sectional 
variance of spreads. Regressions are OLS-estimated but t statistics and R² values are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Results are displayed in Table 5. 
Table 5 about here 
The difference in floating market value does not significantly impact any of the differences in 
spread (except in one regression at the 10% threshold), proving that samples are well matched 
on this criterion. The  V ln ∆  coefficients are nearly always significantly negative, which 
indicates that the matching is not perfect for this variable and that the differences in volumes 
partially explain the differential spreads. Unsurprisingly, volatility appears to be the major 
explaining factor: coefficients for this independent variable are all positive, as expected, and  
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associated with the highest t-values. Differences in spread are positively related to imbalance 
differences (except in the case of  wes ∆ ), while the number of trades, with significantly 
negative coefficients in only 3 regressions, has a weak explanatory power. Finally, the 
difference in price has a substantial impact and affect spreads in the expected way. 
Let us focus now on institutional features. Consistently with Ronen and Weaver (2001), all 
measures of differential spreads,  aqs ∆ ,  aes ∆  and  wes ∆ , significantly increase with the 
difference in tick size. This positive link between ticks and spreads cannot be assigned to the 
fact that  tick ∆  could play the role of a proxy for price level, as, when  P ∆  is introduced in the 
model (regression design (10)), the tick coefficients remain significant at the 1% level. 
Regressions designed as equation (9) have a significant positive intercept for the three 
measures of differential spread, meaning that even when controlling for stock characteristics 
and tick size, spreads are still superior at the LSE than on Euronext. Their adjusted R² exceeds 
the ones we obtain in the regressions of type (10), which evidences that the fact that a security 
is traded on SETS rather than on NSC (represented by the constant variable) has more 
explanatory power for the difference in executions costs than the difference in price. When 
the constant is replaced by the SETS stock’s fragmentation rate, adjusted R² increase for 
every measure of spreads. The fragmentation rate coefficients are all positive and their t-
values are superior to those associated to the intercepts in regressions of type (9). This finding 
leads us to the conclusion that the main feature explaining the excess in spread on SETS is the 
market activity of dealers outside the order book, confirming hypothesis H2. 
6. Conclusion 
Both SETS and NSC are electronic order-driven systems with similar functionalities. The 
main difference lies in that a great part of the order flow in SETS stocks is executed by 
dealers out of the order book while almost all trades in Euronext stocks are executed inside 
the NSC order book. More than a half of trading volumes in euros and in number of trades are 
actually executed by dealers outside the SETS order book. In order to measure the impact of 
this fragmentation of the order flow on execution costs, we compare two samples of stocks 
matched on economic sector, free float capitalisation and trading volumes, and find 
substantial differences in the trading characteristics of both markets. First, although the risk 
level of both samples’ stocks are of similar range, the variance of closing returns is 
significantly higher for SETS stocks. Second, all measures of trading costs (quoted spreads, 
effective spreads and marginal costs) are in favour of NSC. Concerning effective spreads, a  
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breakdown per class of trade size shows that SETS in-order-book average effective spreads 
are larger than NSC spreads for every class except for trades over 2,500 thousand €. The 
distribution of trade sizes evidences that transactions are larger and less frequent in the hybrid 
order-driven market. This market is globally more expensive but offers superior immediacy in 
counterpart. 
To interpret the spread differences, we proceeded to spread decompositions in a first stage, 
and to cross-sectional regressions involving economic and institutional determinants of 
spreads in a second stage. The spread decompositions state that the order processing cost 
component logically accounts for a much bigger part of the spread on the hybrid market than 
on the centralised order book. Moreover, the weight of the inventory holding component is, 
conversely to the intuition, higher on NSC than on SETS, but is maximum on SETS when 
considering order book trades only. This might be the reflection that, at the LSE, dealers 
probably trade in the SETS order book when they need to rebalance inventories. The adverse 
selection component rises to relatively comparable levels on SETS and NSC; yet, when 
excluding off-order-book trades from the SETS dataset, it increases dramatically. We interpret 
this result as a possible clustering of trades between SETS market segments according to their 
informational content, the dealers skimming off the least informed. The cross-sectional 
analyses put forward that two institutional features explain the differential spreads between 
SETS and NSC: the tick size and the share of volume executed by dealers in the SETS 
market, the latter having the highest significance. 
We conclude that the dealers’ market activity beside the order book brings additional 
immediacy and contributes to the development of an efficient block market, but, in 
counterpart, is unfavourable to small and medium traders who pay higher execution costs than 
on a centralised order book.  
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Description of NSC (Euronext Paris) and SETS (LSE) 
Organisational feature  NSC (Euronext Paris)  SETS (LSE) 
Trading mechanism  – Automated, order-driven and continuous 
market system 
– Automated, order-driven and batch 
auctions for smaller companies 
– Automated, order-driven and continuous 
market system for Blue Chips 
Liquidity providers  – Patient investors (limit orders) 
– « Liquidity providers » provide liquidity 
for small and mid caps in the order book 
– Patient investors (limit orders) 
– RSPs for retail orders, and broker-dealers 
outside the order book 
Most frequent types of orders   – Limit orders 
– Market orders 
–  Limit orders 
–  Market orders 
–  At best orders 




Trading mechanism for 
ordinary trades 
Matching of orders in the electronic order 
book 
– Matching of orders in the order book for 
Blue Chips (SETS) 
– Bilateral negotiations with dealers off the 
order book 
– Processing of retail orders by RSPs, 
generally at a price at least as favourable as 
the order book best limit 
Block market  Ability to process block trades at a price 
between the volume weighted averages of 
the five best order book bid and ask 
quotes, with longer delay for trade 
reporting. Available for large trades and a 
small group of large capitalisations only. 
Automated cross trade procedure (price 
inside the order book best bid and ask 
limits). 
Ability to process protected block trades, that 
is of benefiting from a longer delay for 
reporting the trade 
Trading  day  schedule  Opening call auction at 9.00 am (Paris 
time) 
Continuous auction from 9.00 to 17.30 pm 
Closing call auction at 17.35 pm 
Opening call auction at 8.00 am (Paris time) 
Continuous auction from 8.00 to 16.30 pm 
Closing call auction at 16.35 pm 
Tick size  – Price lower than 50 € : 0,01 € 
– Price between 50 and 100 € : 0,05 € 
– Price between 100 and 500 € : 0,1 € 
– Price over 500 € : 0,5 € 
– Price lower than 5£: 0,25 p 
– Price between 5 and 10£: 0,5 p 




Descriptive statistics on volatility, spreads and trading characteristics 
SETS 
Trading mechanism  NSC 
In the order book  Off the order book 

















































Average trade size (€)  46,305.59 63,705.33  135,192.18 
Statistics are computed for the first six months of 2001 for 55 pairs of securities quoted on either the French market or the British market. Call 
auction trades and VWAP trades were not taken into account. The trading is expressed in € and relates to trade numbers during the first six 
months of 2001 multiplied by the respective trading prices. Average trade numbers are averages over securities of daily trade averages for the 
first six months of 2001. The average trade size is first semester 2001 trading volume (in €) divided by the total number of trades. For each 
security, quoted spreads are firstly calculated by weighting each spread by its time of duration. Finally, quoted and effective spreads are 
calculated as equally-weighted averages. Volatility stands for volatilities calculated on the basis of daily closing price returns. The variable was 
subsequently computed as a non-biased standard error of daily closing price returns. For each variable, standard error values are between 
brackets and medians between square brackets. All these statistics exhibit a significant difference between NSC and SETS at the 1% level.  
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Table 3 













































































































































































































































































This table reports the means of effective spreads on Euronext Paris and SETS for two paired samples of 55 securities. The 
effective spread is classified by class of transaction and by distinguishing order book trades from other trades. Average 
spreads are calculated as averages equally-weighted. Sizes defining the transaction classes are given in thousand euros in the 
first column. For the LSE, the sample has been divided into two groups, according to the fact that transactions may be made 
through the order book on SETS, outside the order book. “iob” stands for in order book and “oob” stands for “off order 
book”. The statistic T corresponds to the two-sample t-test in order to compare the difference between Euronext and SETS. 
Figures in bold mean that the difference is significant at the 5% threshold at least.  
  28
Table 4 
Components of the bid-ask spread on NSC and SETS 
Huang and Stoll’ (1997) two-way decomposition model 
Adverse selection and inventory holding cost component λ 
Market 
Mean Std.  Err.  Median T  S 
SETS (all trades)  17.59% 0.1075  0.1601     
SETS 
(in-order-book trades only)  44.53% 0.0151  0.4459     
NSC  38.16% 0.0097  0.3655     
NSC SETS λ λ −   -20.57% 0.0139  -0.2051  -14.76*** -3.37***  (52<0)
NSC iob _ SETS λ λ −   6.36% 0.0163  0.0634  3.9***  1.82*  (37>0) 
This table presents the results obtained from a two-way decomposition of the spread following Huang and Stoll’s model. λ is the proportion of 
traded spread due to adverse selection and inventory holding cost, the order processing cost being 1- λ. The last two rows present the differences 
in λ and the associated parametric tests of inter-market differences. The statistics T and S correspond respectively to the two-sample t-test and 
the two-sample sign test to compare the difference between NSC and SETS. The figures into brackets show the number of pairs for which the 
difference is either positive or negative.  
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Table 5 
Components of the bid-ask spread on SETS and NSC – Huang and Stoll’ (1997) three-way decomposition model 




Mean Std.  Err.  Median 
Nb of stocks 
with π>0.5 
Mean Std.  Err.  Median 
Nb of stocks 
with α>0 
Mean Std.  Err.  Median
Nb of stocks 
with β>0 
SETS 




44  0.4214 0.0049  0.4274  0  0.286 0.0265 0.2573  31  0.2557 0.0202 0.261  28 
NSC 25  0.5148 0.0189  0.5387  14  0.0924 0.0139 0.0807  14  0.1743  0.12  0.184  22 
This table presents the results obtained from the Huang and Stoll’s three-way decomposition model of the spread using the serial correlation of trade flows when trades are bunched. α, β and π designate respectively the 
estimated adverse selection component of the spread, the estimated inventory component of the spread and the estimated probability of a trade reversal. The order processing cost is 1 minus the proportion due to adverse 
selection and inventory holding costs. The number of securities for which π is superior to 0.5 and α and β are significantly positive are also indicated. Concerning α and β, the inter-market mean differences are all significant 
at the 1% level except for  the α  difference between SETS (all trades) and NSC (significant at the 10% level). 
   
  30
Table 6 
Components of the bid-ask spread on SETS and NSC – Huang and Stoll’ (1997) three-way decomposition model – Stock pairs estimates 
SETS firm  NSC firm  NSC π  
SETS π  
iob SETS− π
NSC α  
SETS α  
iob SETS− α
NSC β  
SETS β   iob SETS− β  
Aegis Group  Groupe 
Publicis 






0.5387 0.4436 0.4279 29.13% 6.61% 37.77%  0.3% 17.72%  15.11% 
Pilkington plc  Legrand ord.  0.426 0.4171  0.3897 7.38% 2.69%  30.23%  21.46% 4.5% 39.71% 
Pearson plc  LVMH  0.5577 0.4672 0.4497  7.8% 14.72%  17.25%  18.4% 3.75%  27.75% 
Halifax  Société 
Générale 




Renault  0.5699 0.4372 0.4229 9.23%  2%  24.25%  15.16% 23.45% 34.22% 
Enterprise Oil 
plc  Coflexip  0.3785 0.4412 0.4301 4.48% 3.52% 24.14%  28.73% 16.21% 31.06% 
This table presents the results obtained from the Huang and Stoll’s three-way decomposition model of the spread using the serial correlation of trade flows when trades are bunched. The components are estimated on the 
basis of serial correlation in trade flows with bunching. α, β and π designate respectively the estimated adverse selection component of the spread, the estimated inventory component of the spread and the estimated 
probability of a trade reversal. The order processing cost is 1 minus the proportion due to adverse selection and inventory holding cost.   
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Table 7 
Cross-sectional regressions of the differential spreads between SETS and NSC 
Variable  aqs ∆   aqs ∆   aqs ∆   aes ∆   aes ∆   aes ∆   wes ∆   wes ∆   wes ∆  
Intercept 
0.3101*** 
[6.78]     0.0979*** 
[5.23]     0.2027*** 
[6.92]    






















































P ln ∆     -0.0602*** 
[-4.02]     -0.0185*** 
[-3.06]     -0.0393*** 
[-4.09]   






















































FR     0.6415*** 
[8.87]     0.2129*** 
[7.12]     0.3771*** 
[7.97] 
Adj R²  0.633 0.601 0.663 0.725  0.704 0.737  0.727 0.702  0.738 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression model to explain the difference of effective spreads between NSC and SETS for 55 pairs of firms during the first semester of 2001. 
Observations are monthly for each pair, which results in a sample of 330 (55×6) observations. The dependant variable is either the difference of average quoted spreads, either of 
average effective spreads or of average weighted spreads. The least squares regression models are developed, using hypothesis tests based on consistent estimates of covariance 
matrices allowing for heteroskedasticity, as in White (1980). *, **, *** denote significance of the test at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively: t-statistics are in square brackets. 